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Chapter 1  Introduction  
 
1.1 Background to the Study 
 
The advent in 1994 of democracy in South Africa changed the regulatory framework 
of local government. South African citizens were freed from the shackles of an 
oppressive regime and experienced democratic rule. Freedom from Apartheid came 
with promises of a better life for all and the realisation of constitutionally protected 
human rights. The preamble to the Constitution lays the foundation for an open and 
democratic society with a Bill of Rights, recognising the injustices of the past and 
aiming to improve the quality of life of all citizens. The majority of the electorate 
supported a constitutional mandate, which set the foundation for democracy and 
bestowed a positive obligation on all spheres of government to ensure the 
enforcement of the Bill of Rights, as well as an obligation to ensure that the majority 
of people experience a better life. As part of the new constitutional dispensation, 
South Africa adopted a three-sphere system, comprising of national, provincial and 
local government. As such, municipalities derive powers directly from the 
Constitution. The Constitutional Court held that the constitutional status of local 
government is fundamentally different now as it was when Parliament was supreme 
and the existence of local government was dependent on superior legislatures.1 
 
Municipalities are constitutionally mandated to ensure „democratic and accountable 
government.2 The democratically elected representatives need to account to the 
constituents they represent. To reinforce the constitutional mandate, the following 
legislation was introduced to regulate local government:  
 
 Local Government: Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of 2003,3   
 
 Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000,4 and 
 
 Local Government: Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998.5 
                                                 
1
Fedsure Life Assurance v Greater JHB TMC 1999(1) SA 374 (CC) at paragraphs [35-39] and [393-394]. 
2
S151(2) Constitution. 
3
Hereinafter referred to as the MFMA. 
4
Hereinafter referred to as the Systems Act. 
5
Hereafter referred to as the Structures Act. 
1 
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The policy and legislative framework was developed to ensure, amongst other 
things, that adequate internal oversight structures could be implemented at a 
municipal level. 
  
The Constitution provides that the executive and legislative authority of 
municipalities vests in the municipal council.6 This Constitution gives the power and 
duty to the municipal council to exercise the necessary discretion with the 
formulation and adoption of policies and bylaws in the areas that are listed in Part B 
of Schedule 4 and Part B of Schedule 5 of the Constitution.7 
 
In the first 8 months of 2012, 79,20% of protests turned violent.8 There have been 
more violent protests in the first 8 months of 2012 than there were total protests in 
2011. There remains strong public discontent with municipal service delivery 
throughout South Africa. The Overview Report on the State of Local Government in 
South Africa, issued by the Department of Co-operative Governance and Traditional 
Affairs(COGTA),9 highlighted that disfunctionality and instability within municipalities 
creates opportunities for fraud and corruption to take place. This led to the 
implementation of the newly formed Local Government Turn Around Strategy.10 The 
COGTA report has identified a number of deficiencies within the current structures 
and institutional systems of municipalities and has, as such, identified the need to 
review appropriate procedures and practices to implement critical changes within 
local government. 
 
The following root causes were identified, namely: 
 
 „deployment issues and interference by political parties; 
 
 no clear distinctions between Councils and the administrations; 
 
 unclear boundaries between political representatives and the administration;  
 
                                                 
6
Section 151(2) Constitution. 
7
Section 156(2) Constitution. 
8
 De Visser J and Powell D „Service Delivery Protest Barometer’ pg 1.  
9
Hereafter referred to as COGTA. 
10
COGTA (2010) „Local Government Turn Around Strategy‟ pg 12. 
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 System Act code of conduct not being enforced; 
 
 poor political management and leadership;  
 
 insufficient application of oversight function on all levels; 
 
 insufficient controls within the system; 
 
 no clear framework or lack of understanding of party- municipal relations; 
 
 poor councillors skills base in many areas; 
 
 nepotism, cronyism, poor ethics and weak accountability frameworks; 
 
 political factionalism results in territorial economic elites, and 
 
 political factionalism undermines democratic principles.‟11 
 
The COGTA report thus suggests that the challenges within municipalities is due to 
the lack of capacity, inadequate financial management systems and various 
external factors, such as patronage and cronyism.12 
 
1.2  Statement of the Problem 
 
This study critically analyses whether the legal framework, governing local 
government, provides for adequate legal instruments to improve oversight and 
accountability and whether municipalities are making effective use of the available 
legal instruments.  
 
The key question in this research paper is how internal oversight within 
municipalities can be improved with specific reference to the various mandatory 
reporting obligations in terms of the MFMA and various other legislative obligations 
of local government. 
 
                                                 
11
COGTA (2009) „The State of Local Government in South Africa Overview Report National State of Local 
Government Assessments‟ pg 72. 
12
COGTA (2009) „State of Local Government in South Africa‟ pg 26. 
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1.3  Focus and rationale of the study 
 
The study will focus on specific oversight mechanisms, which need to be 
implemented within the municipal council and the administration in terms of the 
legislative framework. This study will also analyse by way of a case study the 
internal oversight mechanisms within the Drakenstein Municipality and compare this 
to the legislative framework and the policy framework for local government. This 
study will look at municipal governance with specific reference to the MFMA, the 
functioning of the mayoral committee and the municipal council, the mandate and 
function of the Audit Committee and the Internal Audit Unit, the implementation and 
effectiveness of the Integrated Development Plan13 and the Service Delivery and 
Budget Implementation Plan14, performance management and the separation of 
powers between the municipal council and the administration. The analysis will 
highlight shortcomings in the current legislative framework and develop 
recommendations in order to improve internal oversight.  
  
Recommendations will be made in order to improve the current oversight 
mechanisms employed by municipalities. The study is limited in that it does not deal 
with oversight that national and provincial governments need to exercise over 
municipalities. 
 
Whilst a lot of studies had been conducted on improving political oversight at 
national and provincial level, little is understood about it in local government due to 
the lack in concrete empirical research at a local government level. This study 
contributes towards an understanding of the legal framework surrounding the 
improvement of oversight at a political and administrative level. 
 
1.4 Methodology 
 
The study will be based on legislation, desktop research, case law, academic 
journal articles, circulars, the Auditor-General reports and the internet which are 
used extensively. A case study of the Drakenstein municipality will also be 
conducted which will include an analysis of reports and council minutes.  
                                                 
13
 Hereafter referred to as the IDP. 
14
 Hereafter referred to as SDBIP. 
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Chapter 2   
 
Definition of key concepts and Legal and Policy Frameworks of Local 
Government and Systems and Structures of Municipalities 
 
2.1 Defining Oversight  
 
Defining oversight within local government is not easy because information 
concerning oversight within local government is limited. Furthermore, limited 
empirical research has been conducted in this regard. Most of the information 
relates to oversight conducted in other spheres of government namely provincial 
and national government. Senay and Besdziek argue that there is no definition of 
oversight in dictionaries of political terminology.15 
 
They define „oversight‟ in the South African provincial context as: 
 
„the proactive interaction initiated by a legislature with the Executive and 
administrative organs of a province that encourages compliance with the 
constitutional obligation on the Executive and administration to account to the 
public‟s elected representatives and which advances the ideals of good 
government, development and co-operative governance.‟16 
 
In the Oversight and Accountability Model of Parliament, oversight is defined as a 
constitutionally mandated function of the legislative organs of state to scrutinise and 
oversee the executive action of any organ of state.17 The Oversight and 
Accountability Model of Parliament, provides that oversight entails the informal and 
formal, watchful, strategic and structured scrutiny exercised by the legislature in 
respect of the implementation of laws, the application of the budget, and the strict 
observance of statues and the Constitution.18 These definitions will guide the course 
of the research.  
                                                 
15Senay C and Besdziek D (1999) ‘Enhancing Oversight in South Africa’s Provinces Institutions and 
Concerns’ pg 3 of 28.  
16
Senay C and Besdziek D (1999) ‘Enhancing Oversight in South Africa’s Provinces Institutions and 
Concerns’ pg 6 of 28. 
17
Parliament (2009) ‘Oversight and Accountability Model’ pg 6. 
18
Parliament: (2009) ‘Oversight and Accountability Model’ pg 6. 
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2.2 Importance of Oversight  
 
In the context of international requirements the importance for oversight has been 
highlighted by being able:  
 
 „to detect and prevent abuse, arbitrary behaviour or illegal and 
unconstitutional conduct on the part of the government and public agencies. 
At the core of this function is the protection of the rights and liberties of 
citizens; 
 
 to hold the government to account in respect of how taxpayers‟ money is 
used. It detects waste within the machinery of government and public 
agencies, thus it can improve the efficiency, economy and effectiveness of 
government operations; 
 
 to ensure that policies announced by government and approved by 
Parliament are actually delivered. This function includes monitoring the 
achievement of goals set by legislation and the government‟s own 
programmes; and 
 
 
 to improve the transparency of government operations and enhance public 
trust in the government, which is itself a condition of effective policy 
delivery.‟19 
 
Oversight is thus an integral part of any democratic dispensation. Within the 
municipal context the municipal council is directly elected by the electorate it 
represents and thus has the constitutional mandate to conduct oversight over the 
administration and the executive. In terms of the findings of COGTA, effective 
oversight will have to be exercised in order to monitor:  
 
 „the extent to which service delivery is implemented within municipalities;  
 
 to what extent municipalities are optimising the revenue base;  
                                                 
19
Parliament (2009) „Oversight and Accountability Model‟ pg 7. 
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 whether municipalities are able to meet their developmental mandate by 
providing free basic services;  
 
 whether the municipality is compliant with legislation, as well as 
implementing good governance; and  
 
 
 whether municipalities are recruiting experienced and qualified staff‟20. 
 
As accountability is one of the tenets of a democracy, the purpose of improving 
internal oversight in local government is to hold the municipal executive and the 
administration accountable should they fail to implement the constitutional mandate 
of local government. The municipal council must improve oversight over the 
administration and the executive by implementing critical checks and balances to 
ensure that the municipality implement the constitutional mandate.  
 
The implementation of oversight will have a positive impact as it may lead to 
improved service delivery and accountability. The council will be able to monitor 
whether the administration implements the constitutional mandate. The 
improvement of oversight will contribute to re-orienting policies, by-laws and 
budgets in favour of communities. Incidences of wasteful expenditure, corruption, 
and under-spending will be minimised and there will be more revenue to spend on 
the developmental duties of local government. The improvement of oversight will 
also ensure that policies and by-laws are drafted to cater for the specific needs of 
communities. Improving systems for political oversight within municipalities will limit 
political interference into the administration and ensure that the municipal manager 
and senior managers are accountable to the municipal council.  
  
                                                 
20
COGTA (2010) pg 46-47. 
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2.3. Legal and Policy Framework 
 
2.3.1  No separation in terms of the Constitution 
 
Local government is an autonomous sphere of government and derives its powers 
directly from the Constitution.21 The Structures Act provides that each municipality 
must have a municipal council.22 The Constitution does not provide for a separation 
of powers in local government:  
  
“the executive and legislative authority of a municipality is vested in its Municipal 
Council”.23  
 
So therefore the executive and the legislature are not separate branches as is the 
case in the national and provincial spheres of government.24 The municipal council 
makes by-laws and needs to ensure that they are executed. The electorate knows 
that the council is responsible for policy making and governance. This places the 
electorate in a position to hold the council accountable to implement their legislative 
mandate. The Structures Act, Systems Act and MFMA give content to the 
constitutional provisions on the interface between the municipal council and the 
administration. The challenge is that this legislative collective is difficult to 
implement because the provisions are open to various interpretations.  
 
2.3.2 The choice of executive structures in terms of statutory law 
 
This discussion will focus on the executive structures to facilitate a better 
understanding of the separation of powers at a municipal level. Though the 
Constitution does not provide for separation of powers within the municipality, the 
statutes provide for executive structures. Discussion will focus on the executive 
structures to facilitate a better understanding of separation of powers at a municipal 
level. The Structures Act provides for categories of municipalities and lists various 
municipal types that are possible within each category. The Structures Act makes 
provision that various combinations of executive systems and participatory systems 
                                                 
21
S151 (2) Constitution. 
22
S18(1).Structures Act. 
23
S151(2) Constitution. 
24
Ss 44 &104 Constitution. 
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can be established.25 The executive system of government is the structure through 
which executive authority is exercised in a municipality. The MEC for local 
government determines the type of system by publishing a notice in the Provincial 
Gazette in terms of section 12 of the Structures Act.26 The MEC for local 
government in consultation with municipalities can choose between three different 
systems of municipal government or a combination of those systems including the 
following:  
 
 Collective executive system which allows for the exercise of executive 
authority through an executive committee in which the executive leadership 
of the municipality is collectively vested; 
 
 Mayoral executive system where the mayor exercises executive authority 
and is assisted by a mayoral committee;  and 
 
 Plenary executive system which limits the exercise of executive authority to 
the council itself.27 
 
2.4 The Executive Committee System 
 
2.4.1 Composition/ Election 
 
The Constitution provides that the council may elect an executive committee subject 
to national legislation.28 A municipality may establish an executive committee if it is 
of a type that is empowered to establish an executive committee as explained 
above. The Structures Act provides that the executive committee members must be 
elected within 14 days after the municipal council‟s election.29 The committee‟s term 
of office expires when a new municipal council is elected.30 
 
The Act furthermore provides that parties and interests represented in the municipal 
council are represented in the executive committee in substantially the same 
                                                 
25
S7 Structures Act. 
26
S12(3)( c) Structures Act. 
27
S7 Structures Act. 
28
S160(1)(c) Constitution. 
29
S45 Structures Act. 
30
S46(b) Structures Act. 
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proportion as they are represented in the municipal council.31 However, the 
municipal council may use alternative mechanisms to elect an executive committee, 
provided it complies with section 160(8) of the Constitution.32 
 
One member of the executive must be elected by the council as the mayor and may 
serve a maximum of two consecutive terms.33 The executive committee must report 
on all its decisions to the council.34 The council may remove one or more or all the 
members of the executive committee, but must notify the members beforehand.35 
 
2.4.2. Functions of the Executive Committee 
   
The Structures Act provides that the executive committee is the principal committee 
of the council.36 The executive committee has specific functions in terms of the 
Structures Act namely to: 
 
 identify the needs of the municipality; 
 
 review and evaluate those needs in order of priority; 
 
 recommend strategies, programmes and services to the municipal council to 
address priority needs through the integrated development plan and 
estimates of revenue and expenditure taking into account any applicable 
national and provincial development plans; 
 
 recommend or determine the best methods, including partnership and other 
approaches, to deliver those strategies, programmes and services to the 
maximum benefit of the community; 
 
 identify and develop criteria in terms of which progress in the implementation 
of the strategies, programmes referred to in subsection (2)( c) can be 
                                                 
31
S43(2) Structures Act. 
32
S43(3) Structures Act. 
33
S45 & 48(6) Structures Act. 
34
S44 Structures Act. 
35
S53 Structures Act. 
36
S44(1)(a) Structures Act.  
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evaluated, including key performance indicators which are specific to the 
municipality; 
 
 evaluate progress against the key performance indicators; 
 
 oversee the provision of services to the community in a sustainable manner; 
 
 perform such duties and exercise such powers as the municipal council may 
delegate to it; 
 
 annually report on the involvement of the communities and community 
organisations in the affairs of the municipality; and 
 
 ensure that regard is given to public views and report on the effect of 
consultation on the decisions of the municipal council.37 
 
The Act furthermore provides that the executive committee is a committee of the 
council, which receives reports from the other committees of the municipal council 
and must forward these reports with recommendations to the council, when it 
cannot dispose of the matter in terms of its delegated powers.38 Within the 
executive committee system, the council delegates powers and duties to the 
executive committee.39 
 
2.4.3 Mayoral Executive System 
 
The discussion will now turn to the other executive system, namely the executive 
mayoral system.   
 
The executive leadership of the municipality is vested in the executive mayor and 
not in a collective committee, as is the case in a collective executive system.40 The 
executive mayoral system is characterised by a powerful mayor who is assisted by 
a mayoral committee.41  
                                                 
37
Ss44(a)-(h) Structures Act. 
38
S44(1)(b) Structures Act. 
39
S7(b) & 48(1) Structures Act. 
40
Bekink B Principles of South African Local Government Law (2006) 129. 
41
De Visser J, Steytler N & May A (2009) „The Quality of Local Democracies A Study into the Functionality of 
Municipal Governance Arrangements’ pg 11. 
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The term of office of the executive mayor runs concurrently with that of the council, 
unless the mayor needs to vacate office before expiry of the political term.42 The 
Structures Act determines the functions and powers of executive mayors, which 
mirror that of the executive committee.43 The executive mayor has the same 
functions as the executive committee see paragraph 2.3.2. According to Bekink, the 
mayoral executive system should provide for decisive leadership and rapid-decision 
making, which is useful in larger and complex municipalities.44 
 
2.4.4  Mayoral Committee 
 
The executive mayor exercises executive authority with the assistance of a  
mayoral committee.45 The executive mayor may appoint and dismiss members of 
the mayoral committee.46 The Structures Act provides that the executive mayor: 
 
 „must appoint a  mayoral committee to assist him or her; 
 
 may delegate specific responsibilities to each member of the committee; and 
 
 may delegate any of the executive mayor‟s powers to the respective 
members.‟47 
 
 The mayoral committee is dissolved when the executive mayor ceases to 
hold office.48The mayoral committee members play a dominant role within 
the municipality and usually have considerable powers. 
 
2.4.5 Role of the mayor in terms of the MFMA 
 
The MFMA bestows various financial responsibilities on the mayor, which is vital 
when it comes to municipalities complying with the constitutional mandate and the 
                                                 
42
Ss57 (b) & 59 Structures Act. 
43
S56(2) Structures Act. 
44
Bekink B Principles of South African Local Government Law (2006) 128. 
45
S60 Structures Act. 
46
S60 Structures Act. 
47
S60 (a)-(c) Structures Act. 
48
S60(4) Structures Act. 
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prescripts of the MFMA.49 Cognisance must be taken of the fact that reference to 
the mayor in the MFMA refers to both the executive mayor and the executive 
committee.50 The MFMA provides that he or she must provide political guidance 
over the fiscal and financial affairs of the municipality. The mayor may monitor the 
exercise of responsibilities of the municipal manager and chief financial officer, but 
may not interfere in the exercise of those responsibilities.51 The mayor has a duty to 
ensure that the municipality performs its constitutional and statutory functions within 
the confines of the budget of the municipality and must report to the municipal 
council on all budget related matters.52 Practically the mayor cannot fulfil all these 
duties him or herself and therefore delegates it to officials within the administration. 
 
The MFMA provides that the mayor needs to ensure that the budget is aligned with 
the service delivery projections and may revise these service delivery targets and 
performance indicators only with the approval of the municipal council.53 
 
A critical requirement is that the mayor must identify financial irregularities and 
report them to the council.54 Should service delivery target or performance 
indicators be altered and if the municipality faces financial difficulties, the mayor 
must ensure that the public is notified.55 
 
2.5 Separation of Politics from Administration 
 
2.5.1  Separation of the Council and Municipal Administration 
 
Discussion will focus on the separation of the council and the administration 
because of the close link at an institutional and legislative level. The legislative 
framework does not clearly define the separation between the council and the 
administration and it causes unwarranted political interference into the 
administration. According to Svara one of the most important and enduring 
theoretical constructs in public administration is the politics-administration 
                                                 
49
S52 MFMA.  
50
S 59(1)(a)-(c ) MFMA. 
51
S52(a) & (b) MFMA. 
52
S52(d) MFMA. 
53
S54(1)(b)-(d) MFMA.  
54
S54(1)(e) & (2). 
55
S54(3) MFMA. 
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dichotomy model.56 The premise of the model is based on the rationale of insulating 
public administration practice from political interference. The dichotomy model as it 
applies to local government holds that: 
 
 „the city municipal council does not get involved in the  administration,  
 
 the city manager has no involvement in shaping policies; 
 
 the manager occupies the role of a neutral expert who efficiently and 
effectively carries out the policies of the municipal council.‟57 
 
Svara furthermore argues that administrators do not exercise discretion, for to do so 
open the door to interpreting policy and how to apply it. Municipal managers are 
politically appointed by the council who generally favour candidates who are aligned 
to the party or coalition that govern that municipality. By the same token municipal 
managers cannot divorce themselves from political influence and patronage. 
Similarly senior management are also politically appointed and have to assist in the 
facilitation of policy making.   
 
Separating politics from the administration will curb political meddling and thereby 
the council‟s ability to conduct proper oversight. The council will still be in control of 
the administration, but at the same time allow administrators to maintain their 
independence to adhere to professional values and standards and be responsive 
towards the public.58 The advantage of separating the municipal administration from 
politics is that it will improve political accountability and oversight. It will make the 
political practices more accountable to the legislative framework. The effective 
implementation of such a separation within municipalities will assist in ensuring that 
officials act politically impartial in implementing the council‟s mandate. Furthermore, 
separating the municipal administration from politics will curb political meddling in 
the administration and officials can voice their agreement or discontent without fear 
of victimisation when they become aware that policies or by-laws are implemented 
to advance political ideologies.  
 
                                                 
56
Svara JH (1998) „The politics –administration dichotomy model as aberration’  pg 176. 
57
Svara JH (1998) „The politics –Administration dichotomy model as aberration’  pg 179. 
58
Svara JH (1998)  The politics –Administration dichotomy model as aberration  pg 179. 
 
 
 
 
 15 
 
In order to establish if such a separation of politics and the administration exists in 
local government the legal framework, as it pertains to the municipal administration, 
will be discussed with particular reference to the appointment of the municipal 
manager, the appointment of senior managers often referred to as section 56 
managers and the recruitment of municipal staff. These appointments have a direct 
bearing on the administration as the municipality is dependent on a competent 
personnel corps that is separated from the political structures, is minimally 
influenced and not susceptible to political manipulation.  
 
2.5.2 Appointment of the Municipal Manager 
 
Crucial appointments within the municipal administration are that of the accounting 
officer. The Systems Act provides that the council must appoint a municipal 
manager as head and accounting officer of the administration.59 The appointment of 
the municipal manager is not merely a staff appointment as contemplated in section 
160(1)(d) of the Constitution.60 The Systems Act regulates the appointment of the 
municipal manager. 
 
Legislation prohibits the municipal council to delegate the appointment of the 
municipal manager to the municipal executive.61 The Systems Act provides that the 
municipal council also appoints the managers directly accountable to the municipal 
manager.62 The municipal council merely needs to consult the municipal manager 
when it appoints senior managers.63 
 
Furthermore, in terms of the Systems Act the municipal council must advertise the 
post nationally.64 In terms of The Systems Act both the MEC and Minister monitor 
these appointments whereas previously the council was solely responsible for these 
appointments.65 
 
                                                 
59
S54 A Systems Act. 
60
Executive Municipal Council of the Western Cape v Minister of Provincial Affairs and Constitutional 
Development Executive Municipal Council of KwaZulu- Natal v President of the Republic of South Africa 
1999(12) BCLR1360 (CC) at para 109. 
61
Mbana v Mnquma Municipality 2004(1) BCLR 83 (Tk) and Mqoqi v City of Cape Town and another; City of 
Cape Town v Mgoqi and another 2006(4) SA 355(C) 574. 
62
S56(1)(a) Systems Act. 
63
S56(1)(a) Systems Act. 
64
S56(3)(a) & (b) Systems Act. 
65
Ss56 (4A) & (b) Section 56 Systems Act & Section 82(1)(a) Structures Act. 
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2.5.3 Competency requirements and disqualifications 
 
A report of the Department of Co-operative Governance and Traditional Affairs on 
the State of Local Government in South Africa bemoans the fact that the 
competency levels for critical middle and senior municipal management positions 
are not regulated.66 There are three sets of laws that govern competency 
requirements and disqualifications namely the Systems Act and its regulations, the 
MFMA and the National Treasury Minimum Competency Regulations for 
Accounting Officers of 2001. The person appointed as municipal manager must 
have the prescribed qualifications, including skills, expertise and competencies.67  
 
The Systems Act makes specific provision that individuals need to possess “skills”, 
“expertise”, “competencies” and “qualifications” in order to be appointed as 
municipal manager.68 This is complemented by regulations of the National Treasury 
on the Minimum Competency Levels for Accounting Officers, senior managers, 
finance officials and other officials responsible for supply chain management of 
municipalities.69 Accounting Officers are also required to have the core occupational 
and managerial competencies as described by the Municipal Performance 
Regulations.70 In terms of the Systems Act an appointment is null and void if the 
candidate did not have the prescribed skills, expertise, competencies and 
qualifications or the appointment was made in contravention of the Act.71  
 
In Allen Paulse v Oudsthoorn Local Municipality the municipal council‟s 
appointment of a municipal manager was reviewed against the provisions of section 
54 A of the Systems Act with particular reference to whether the appointment of a 
municipal manager is subject to regulation 38. Regulation 38 provides that in order 
to be appointed candidates must possess a minimum of five (5) years‟ experience 
at senior management level. 72 The municipality shortlisted five candidates, namely 
Mar. TT Mnyimba, Mr T Paulse, Dr E Rankwana, Mr D du Plessis and Mr K 
Rosenberg. Besides the interviews which were conducted, the candidates were 
                                                 
66
COGTA (2009) ‘The State of Local Government in South Africa Overview Report National State of Local 
Government Assessments’ pg 31. 
67
S54A(2) Systems Act. 
68
S56(1)(ii)(b) Systems Act. 
69
National Treasury (2001) ‘Guideline for Municipal Competency Levels: Accounting Officers’ pg 1. 
70
Provincial and Local Government( 2001) Municipal Planning and Performance Management Regulations.  
71
S 56(2)(a)&(b) Systems Act , the Minister may waive any of  the requirements listed. 
72
Allen Paulse v Oudtshoorn Local Municipality unreported Case No: 25790/2011  para 54 and 55.  
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subject to integrity and competency tests. During the selection process the report 
submitted to the council only contained the interview results in terms of which Mr TT 
Mnyimba was the better candidate. It did not include the scores on competencies 
required in terms of regulation 38. The selection panel appointed Mr TT Mnyimba. 
The court declared the appointment of Mr TT Mnyandi as „null and void‟.73 The 
appointment was declared „null and void‟ because the candidate did not possess 
the minimum competencies. The judgment reveals that the appointment of a 
municipal manager is subject to the provisions of regulation 38. It is the contention 
of this study that though the Court did not decide on the issue regarding alleged 
political interference, this case is illustrative of cadre deployment as even though 
the candidate did not possess the minimum competencies, the selection process 
was manipulated to ensure a particular outcome. 
 
This case illustrates that an appointment is null and void if the candidate did not 
have the prescribed skills, expertise, competencies and qualifications or the 
appointment was made in contravention of the Act.  
 
2.5.4 Functions of the Municipal Manager 
 
As accounting officer, the municipal manager has various responsibilities conferred 
by statute as well as those conferred to him in terms of delegations. The municipal 
manager serves as the interface between the political-structures, office bearers, 
and the municipal administration.74 The municipal manager may delegate and sub-
delegate any of the statutory powers, functions and duties to staff members with the 
approval of the municipal council.75 The Systems Act provides that as head of the 
administration, the municipal manager is subject to the policy directions of the 
council and is responsible and accountable for the exercise of various functions.76 
De Visser asserts that one of the key challenges in transformation of local 
government is defining the roles of the municipal manager in relation to the 
executive committee or executive mayor of the municipality.77 
                                                 
73
Allen Paulse and Oudtshoorn Local Municipality unreported Case No: 25790/2011 para 85. 
74
Steytler N & De Visser J (2009) Local Government Law of South Africa pg 8-21. 
75
Ss55 & 59(4) Systems Act. 
76
Ss 55(1)(a)-(q) & 55(2)(c) of the Municipal Systems Act provides that the Municipal Manager is responsible 
for accountable Administration, implement IDP, Performance Management System, manage the 
Administration, advise political structures, political office bearers, ensure compliance with the MFMA. 
77
De Visser J (2001) Roles and Responsibilities of the Municipal Manager pg 1.  
 
 
 
 
 18 
 
 
2.5.5 Appointment of section 56 managers 
 
In light of the various responsibilities bestowed upon the municipal manager, it is 
critical that such a person needs to be supported by competent staff in order to 
perform these duties.78 Section 56 of the Systems Act provides that the municipal 
council after consultation with the municipal manager appoints managers directly 
accountable to the municipal manager. Such persons must have relevant skills and 
expertise to perform the duties associated with the post.79 The same structure as 
outlined in paragraph 2.5.2 applies to the appointment of section 56 managers. 
 
2.5.6 Appointment of other staff 
 
The municipality needs to appoint staff other than section 56 managers to ensure 
the successful implementation of its functions. The Systems Act provides that the 
municipal manager must develop an organogram, which needs to be submitted to 
the municipal council for approval.80 It is the responsibility of the municipal manager 
to: 
 
 „provide a job description for each post on the staff establishment; 
 
 attach to the post the remuneration and service conditions as may be 
determined; and 
 
 establish a process or mechanism to evaluate the staff establishment 
regularly.‟81 
 
The authority to approve a staff establishment is the statutory power of the 
municipal manager.82The council approves the staff establishment which is 
developed by the municipal manager. The municipal manager makes the staff 
appointment onto that establishment. Though in practice appointments may be 
                                                 
78
S 55 (e) & (f) Systems Act.  
79
S 56 (a) & (b) Systems Act. 
80
S 66(1)(a) Systems Act. 
81
S66 (b-d) Systems Act. 
82
S55 (e)  Systems Act. 
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delegated in terms of a system of delegations, it is not prudent to do so. The fact 
that the organogram needs to be approved by the municipal council implies that the 
council has the power to review it and make the necessary changes, if need be.83 
The council thus exercises oversight over staff appointments.  
 
2.5.7 Political Appointments 
 
Research has shown that the appointment of a party official, who occupies a 
position higher than any councillor to an administrative post, runs havoc with all 
legal lines of accountability.84 
 
Partly as a result of the public outcry regarding such political appointments; the 
Municipal Systems Amendment Act now provides that the municipal manager and 
managers directly accountable to the municipal manager may not hold political 
office in a political party or structure thereof.85 The provision does not apply to 
municipal staff members other than senior management level.86 This is a problem 
because there may be junior officials who occupy influential political positions within 
political structures. This may once again have a direct bearing on the 
implementation of oversight by the council. If the administration consist of junior 
staff who occupies influential positions with political parties, the likelihood exists that 
they may not want to be held accountable by the municipal council where some 
councillors may be their juniors at a party political level. Politically affiliated 
administrative staff members may then wield considerable power in the 
administration and within the municipal council. 
 
The Systems Act prohibits political interference into the administration.87 A 
municipal councillor may not interfere in the administration or give instructions to 
any employee of the municipal council, unless mandated to do so.88 No councillor 
may obstruct or attempt to obstruct the implementation of a municipal council 
decision, or encourage or participate in any conduct, which would cause or 
                                                 
83
S66(1)(a)-(d) Systems Act. 
84
De Visser J, Steytler N, Mays A (2009): The Quality of local democracies: A Study into the functionality of 
Municipal Governance Arrangements pg 41.  
85
S56A(1) Systems Act. 
86
 Good Governance Learning Network (2010): Submission on the Local Government Municipal Systems 
Amendment Bill  to the Department of Cooperative Governance pg 3. 
87
Item 11 (a) Schedule 1 Systems Act. 
88
S11(a)-(d) Systems Act. 
 
 
 
 
 20 
 
contribute to mal- administration.89 The MFMA also provides protection against 
political interference into the administration and stipulates that it is a criminal 
offence for a municipal councillor to attempt to influence the municipal manager, 
any other staff member or an agent of a municipality not to enforce an obligation in 
terms of the Systems Act, other legislation, a by-law or a municipal council 
decision.90 The offence is punishable by a fine or imprisonment of up to two years. 
The MFMA is explicit in prohibiting municipal councillors from interfering in the 
administration of tenders by providing that municipal councillors may not be part of 
the evaluation of tenders nor sit in as an observer thereto.91 
 
2.5.8 Summary 
 
The above discussion indicated that improving political oversight within 
municipalities has a clear and critical purpose. The law provides for the 
establishment of executive structures and seeks to separate politics form the 
administration. However, there are several flaws in improving political oversight 
within municipalities. These flaws can be categorised into too much interference by 
the council on the administration, executive dominance, cadre deployment, lack of 
accountability, weak legislative institutions, the lack of separation of power between 
the council and the administration. The challenge within municipalities is that the 
council approves the organogram of the institution. This is a challenge in that 
councillors do not necessarily have the competence and experience to understand 
the institutional requirements of municipalities. Furthermore, both the Systems Act 
and Structures Act provide a legal framework for the appointment of the municipal 
manager and senior managers by the municipal council. The exercise of oversight 
is thus complicated as the municipal council now needs to monitor staff members 
and structures that it approved. Administrators respond to the directives of the 
council rather than to the administration.92 This implies that administrators may be 
tempted to align themselves with the political ideology of the ruling elite. This 
compromises the administrative integrity. When administrators share the same 
platform with politicians, perceptions are formed in terms of affiliation and relation.  
 
                                                 
89
S11(a)-(d) Systems Act. 
90
S117 MFMA, Schedule 1, s 11 Systems Act. 
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S117 MFMA. 
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Fessha Y: (2008) Paper II: Municipal Accountability: Assessing Municipal Accountability Tools pg 29. 
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These flaws negatively affect the implementation of political oversight over the 
administration. In the next chapter this will be further examined by analysing 
oversight structures and mechanisms within local government.  
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Chapter 3: Oversight Structures and Mechanisms 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The legislative framework provides for the implementation of various structures and 
mechanisms within the municipality to facilitate oversight. Mechanisms in this 
context refer to processes implemented by the council to conduct oversight 
whereas structures are institutional arrangements within the administration to 
ensure oversight is implemented. The council plays a critical role in ensuring that 
adequate use is made of these. 
 
This discussion will focus on the various structures that facilitate oversight, namely 
section 79 committees, section 80 committees, the internal audit unit, the audit 
committee and the municipal performance audit committee.  
 
The oversight mechanisms which will be reviewed are the Annual Report, the 
Oversight Report, the Integrated Development Plan93 and Service Delivery and 
Budget Implementation Plan94, budget statements, performance agreements and 
performance evaluations. The municipal council may use all these structures and 
mechanisms to exercise oversight. 
 
3.2 Oversight structures 
 
3.2.1 Committee System: Choice between Section 79 and Section 80 
committee 
 
The council needs to take decisions whether or not portfolio committees will be 
established and whether such committees will be established in terms of section 79 
or section 80 of the Structures Act. 
 
The Structures Act provides generic requirements for the establishment of 
committees. These committees may assist the council to conduct oversight. A 
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Hereafter referred to as IDP. 
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municipality may establish a committee provided for in the Act if the establishment 
of such a committee is necessary taking into account the following indicators to 
determine if such a committee is appropriate namely: 
 
 „the extent of the functions and powers of the municipality; 
 
 the need for the delegation of those functions and powers to the committee 
in order to ensure efficiency and effectiveness in their performance of those 
functions and powers; and 
 
 the section 79 committee and section 80 committees serve different 
purposes and are accountable to different entities.‟95 
 
It should be noted that the capacity of the municipal council to conduct oversight 
over the executive is influenced by the committee system configuration. This is 
because the mayoral committee is not a committee of the council and can conduct 
meetings on important council matters without divulging the content of such 
meetings or opening it up for public scrutiny.  
 
Section 33 of the Structures Act provides for the establishment of committees.  This 
section provides that with the establishment of committees cognisance must be 
taken of the extent of the functions and powers of the municipality; the need to 
delegate the powers in order to ensure efficiency and effectiveness in their 
performance; and the financial and administrative resources of the municipality 
available to support the proposed committee. 96 Committees may be established to 
assist the council to conduct oversight.  
 
3.2.2 Section 79 committees 
 
The municipal council may establish section 79 committees to assist it to exercise 
oversight over the administration. Section 79 committees are not chaired by a 
member of the executive and are thus chaired by a non-executive councillor. A non-
executive councillor in this context refers to a member who was elected, but does 
                                                 
95S33Structures Act. 
96
S33(b)(i) - (iii) Structures Act.  
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not serve on the executive. The chairperson of the section 79 committee can be any 
member of the council.97 It can be a member of the opposition, coalition or the ruling 
party. The council appoints the chairperson, may remove a member of a committee 
at any time, may authorise a committee to co-opt members of the public within the 
limits determined by the council and may determine a committee‟s procedure.98   
 
The municipal council determines the functions of this committee and may delegate 
powers and duties to it.99 The section 79 committee reports to the municipal council. 
However, the municipal executive may alter or amend reports before it is submitted 
to the municipal council because the Structures Act makes provision that the 
executive is entitled to receive reports from committees of the municipal council and 
to forward these reports with recommendations to the council.100 The municipal 
executive thus has the discretion to determine whether reports should be altered or 
not.101  
 
The section 79 committee may co-opt members from the public in an advisory 
capacity and play an oversight role for the effective performance of functions of the 
council.102A section 79 committee could be used to exercise oversight, as it reports 
to the council. Section 79 committees can be used by the council to solicit input 
from the community with regard to the development of policies and developmental 
projects in terms of legislation. The effectiveness of a section 79 committee is, 
however, dependent on its terms of reference, as the council may delegate powers 
and functions to it. The section 79 committee would only be able to function 
according to that mandate.  
 
3.2.3 Section 80 Committees 
 
Section 80 of the Structures Act makes provision for the appointment of committees 
to assist the executive mayor or the executive committee. There may not be more 
section 80 committees than there are executive committee members or mayoral 
                                                 
97
S79(b) Structures Act. 
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S79(2)(c )-(f) Structures Act. 
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S79(2)(a) & (b) Structures Act. 
100
Ss56(1) & 44 (1) Structures Act. 
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committee members.103 The council determines who serves on the section 80 
committee but the municipal executive appoints the chairperson.104 The executive 
committee or executive mayor may delegate powers and duties to the 
committee.105A section 80 committee is not a committee of the municipal council. It 
reports to the executive and is accountable to the executive. Though such a 
committee might be representative of all parties, it must be chaired by a member of 
the executive and reports to the executive.106 These committees are tasked to 
develop policies and proposals and determine which policies are submitted to the 
municipal council to be enacted as policy.107 
 
This is a disadvantage as decision-making maybe centralised within the section 80 
committees that report directly to the executive.  
 
It is contended that in a section 80 committee system, deliberations regarding policy 
options and the implementation thereof, the performance of the municipal 
administration all take place solely in section 80 committees, the content of which is 
conveyed to the executive through a member of the executive.108 This, however, 
does not imply that all members of the section 80 committee have knowledge of 
whether the committee‟s recommendation was delivered to the mayoral 
committee.109 Another disadvantage is that non-executive municipal councillors who 
do not form part of the section 80 committee have limited opportunity to conduct 
oversight.110 The matter is compounded where a municipality makes use of mostly 
section 80 committees who only report to the executive mayor. 
  
3.2.4 Fundamental differences between section 79 and section 80 
committees 
A section 79 committee may be constituted in exactly the same way as a section 80 
committee but the fundamental difference is thus that it may be chaired by a non-
executive councillor. 
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3.3 The internal audit unit and audit committee 
 
3.3.1 Internal audit unit 
 
The International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing 
(ISPPIA) defines internal auditing is an independent, objective assurance and 
consulting activity designed to add value and improve an organisation‟s 
operations.111 It helps an organisation accomplish its objectives by bringing a 
systematic, disciplined approach to evaluate and improve the effectiveness of risk 
management, control and governance processes.112 The Constitution provides the 
basis for National Treasury to prescribe measures to ensure both transparency and 
expenditure control in each sphere of government by introducing generally 
recognised accounting, uniform expenditure classifications; and uniform treasury 
norms and standards.113 The MFMA obligates all municipalities to either establish 
an internal audit unit or to outsource that function.114 
 
The aim of such a unit is to assist municipal managers to effectively discharge their 
fiduciary duty. The internal audit unit initiates an organisational risk-based plan, 
which needs to focus on internal controls, risk and risk management, performance 
management, loss control as determined by the municipal manager.115 Section 165 
of the MFMA provides that the internal audit unit of a municipality must advise the 
municipal manager and report to the Audit Committee on the implementation of the 
internal audit plan and matters relating to: 
 
 „internal audit; 
 
 internal controls; 
 
 accounting procedures and practices; 
 
 risk and risk- based management, and 
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 performance management.‟116 
 
The Municipal Planning and Performance Regulations require that the internal audit 
unit assess the functionality of the municipality‟s performance management system, 
to ensure that it complies with the Systems Act. The internal audit unit plays a 
critical role in auditing compliance with the legislative requirements and reports to 
the municipal manager. The unit furthermore reports on the extent to which the key 
performance indicators are reliable in measuring progress towards the achievement 
of performance targets and submits quarterly reports on the audits to the municipal 
manager and the performance audit committee.  
 
The internal audit unit can also assist the council in improving oversight over the 
administration. The municipal council may use the information generated by the 
internal audit unit to exercise oversight. The council can ask questions, probe and 
hold the administration accountable for any failures to perform and in the event of 
any financial misconduct. In order for the internal audit unit to add value it needs to 
be able to conduct its function in an enabling environment, without interference from 
the administration or the municipal council. 
 
3.3.1.1 Audit Committee in terms of the Municipal Finance 
Management Act 
 
Section 165(2)(b) of the MFMA provides that the internal audit unit must report to an 
audit committee. Legislation prescribes that an independent audit committee needs 
to be established consisting of at least three persons with appropriate experience, 
the majority of whom should not be in the employ of the municipality.117 The audit 
committee does not form part of the administration but in practice the head of the 
internal audit unit performs a secretarial function to assist the audit committee. The 
chairperson of the audit committee is appointed by the municipal council and 
reports directly to and advises the council.118  
 
                                                 
116
S166(2)(a)(i)-(ix)& (b) MFMA. 
117
S166(4)(a) MFMA. 
118
S166(5) &166(2)(a) MFMA. 
 
 
 
 
 28 
 
The purpose of the municipality‟s internal audit and audit committee is to identify 
risks that the municipality could be exposed to and to advise the council 
accordingly.119 The MFMA provides that the audit committee and internal audit unit 
must advise the council on internal financial controls, the outcome of internal audits 
which were conducted and review annual financial statements.120 Furthermore, both 
the audit committee and the internal audit unit must provide the council with an 
objective assessment of the financial position of the municipality, as well as its 
efficiency and effectiveness, risk management, performance management, effective 
governance and performance evaluation.121 
 
A municipal councillor may not be a member audit committee. The audit committee 
must meet as often as required, but at least four times a year.122 The annual 
financial statements must be reviewed by the audit committee, who then has the 
task of informing the council on the adequacy and reliability of financial reporting 
and information.123 The establishment of an audit committee may enhance the 
independence and effectiveness of the internal audit unit, as the municipal manager 
needs to ensure that all reports regarding irregularities, risk, fraud and the like are 
submitted to the audit committee. This in turn ought to enable the council to improve 
oversight. The only way in which municipal councillors can exercise and improve 
oversight is by receiving regular reports on the activities of the administration.  
 
3.3.1.2 Municipal Performance Audit Committee in terms of the 
Municipal Systems Act and Municipal Systems Act Regulations 
 
The legislative framework dictates that the executive committee or executive mayor 
must manage the development of the municipality‟s performance management 
system.124 Section 45 of the Systems Act states that the results of performance 
measurement must be audited internally and by the Auditor-General. Regulation 9 
of the Municipal Planning and Performance Management Regulations obliges a 
municipality to appoint a performance audit committee to conduct the internal audit 
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of the municipality‟s performance.125 The Municipal Planning and Performance 
Management Regulations does not prohibit a councillor from being a member of the 
performance audit committee.126 
 
The Performance Regulations require municipalities to establish a separate 
Performance Audit Committee or extend the role of their existing Audit 
Committee.127 Regulation 14 of the Municipal Performance Management 
Regulations states that one person on the committee must have expertise in 
performance management. The Municipal Planning and Performance Management 
Regulations provides clear guidelines on how performance audits must be 
conducted namely: 
 
 „review the quarterly reports submitted to it; 
 
 review the municipality‟s performance management system and make 
recommendations in this regard to the council of the municipality; and 
 
 at least twice during a financial year submit an audit report to the municipal 
council concerned.‟128 
 
The Municipal Performance Audit Committee is critical in improving the oversight 
role of the municipal council, as it reviews the performance of management and 
determines whether management adhered to the legislative framework governing 
performance management. The committee may access municipal records for the 
purpose of auditing, may summon anyone and may request information from 
anyone.129 
 
The Municipal Performance Audit Committee must ensure that all auditing complies 
with the Municipal Planning and Performance Regulations. The Performance Audit 
Committee verifies that the measurement mechanisms are accurate and that proper 
procedures are followed to evaluate and improve performance. Auditing the 
performance of senior management within the administration is important as the 
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outcome of such audits may be used by the council to conduct oversight. The aim of 
performance auditing is to evaluate the measures implemented, which will enable 
the municipal council to assess whether resources are procured economically and 
utilised efficiently and effectively.  
 
In the next section, the various mechanisms which the council can use to conduct 
oversight will be discussed. 
 
3.4 Oversight Mechanisms 
 
The oversight mechanisms that will be reviewed are the Annual Report, the 
Oversight Report, the IDP and the SDBIP, budget statements and performance 
evaluations. All these structures and mechanisms may be used by the council to 
conduct oversight.  
 
3.4.1 Annual Report 
 
Municipalities must annually prepare an annual report which must be submitted to 
the municipal council within nine months after the end of a financial year.130 Every 
municipality and municipal entity must prepare an Annual Report for each financial 
year in accordance with the MFMA.131 The purpose of the Annual Report is: 
 
 „to provide a record of the activities of the municipality or municipal entity; 
 
 to provide a report on performance in service delivery and budget 
implementation; 
 
 to provide information that supports the revenue and expenditure decisions 
made, and 
 
 to promote accountability to the local community for decisions made.‟132 
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All municipalities are obligated to report on all aspects of performance providing a 
true, honest and accurate account of the goals set by the municipal council and the 
success or failures in achieving these goals.133 The Annual Report is a key 
performance report to the community and stakeholders and, once approved by the 
municipal council, must be placed on the municipal website.134 In terms of the 
MFMA all municipalities must provide the following information in their Annual 
Report: 
 
 „the annual financial statements; 
 
 the Auditor-General‟s report on the financial statements; 
 
 any explanations that may be necessary to clarify issues in connection with the 
financial statements; 
 
 an assessment by the Accounting Officer on any arrears on municipal taxes and 
service charges; 
 
 particulars of any corrective action taken or to be taken in response to issues 
raised in the audit reports; 
 
 any information as determined by the municipality  entity; 
 
 any recommendations of the Audit Committee, and  
 
 any information as may be prescribed.‟135 
 
 
The Annual Report is relevant for oversight as it is may be used to ensure 
transparent governance as it reports on the performance for the year.136 The annual 
report is the most important report regarding all the operations and functions of the 
municipality. It provides a detailed record of service delivery, income and 
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expenditure and financial allocations. The council can use the Annual Report to 
determine the financial state of the municipality and whether service delivery targets 
were implemented within the constraints of the budget. It is relevant as an oversight 
and accounting mechanism as it captures all the financial transactions that pertain 
to service delivery on an annual basis.137  
 
3.4.2 Oversight Report 
 
The council of the municipality must consider the annual report of the municipality 
and any entity under the municipality‟s sole or shared control, and by no later than 
two months from the date on which the annual report was tabled in the municipal 
council, adopt an oversight report containing the council‟s comments on the annual 
report.138 The comments to be submitted by the council must include a statement 
whether the council has: 
 
 approved the annual report with or without reservations;  
 
 rejected the report; or  
 
 
 referred the annual report back for revision on those components that can be 
revised.139 
 
The oversight report plays a key role in ensuring that the executive and 
administration are held accountable for performance. In terms of the Guidelines by 
National Treasury the oversight committees should consist only of non-executive 
councillors.140 An oversight committee is established for the „detailed analysis and 
review of the annual report and the drafting of an oversight report that may be taken 
to full council for discussion‟.141 The oversight report must be clearly distinguished 
from the annual report.142 The oversight report is a report of the council and follows 
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consideration and consultation on the annual report by the municipal council 
itself.143 After considering the annual report, the municipal council drafts the 
oversight report. This oversight report is important as it may be used by the council 
to determine whether the administration is performing in terms of the developmental 
objectives as determined during the Integrated Development Planning process.  
 
The oversight report is relevant as it will give the municipal council an indication 
whether the resources of the organisation are used efficiently, effectively and 
economically. 
 
3.5 Integrated Development Plan (IDP) and Service Delivery and 
Budget Implementation Plan (SDBIP) 
 
The IDP is the strategic planning document of the municipality and outlines how the 
municipality aims to achieve the developmental objectives of local government, as 
well as to give effect to its developmental duties as set out in the Constitution. The 
IDP is a statement of the municipal council‟s vision for the long-term development of 
the municipality and must emphasise the municipality‟s most critical development 
and internal needs. The IDP is thus a key development instrument.   
 
The IDP must:- 
 
 „link, integrate and co-ordinate plans and proposals for the development of 
the municipality; 
 
 align the resources and capacity of the municipality with the plan;  
 
 be compatible with national and provincial development plans and planning 
requirements binding on the municipality in terms of legislation.‟144  
 
The Systems Act and the Municipal Planning Regulations provide that the IDP must 
be integrally linked to budget projections, based on the development priorities, 
objectives and performance targets set by the municipality.145  
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The Systems Act makes the executive committee or executive mayor responsible 
for the implementation, evaluation and monitoring of the IDP.146 The MFMA requires 
the mayor to provide general political guidance over the budget process and the 
priorities that must guide the preparation of the budget.147 This task includes 
integrating the municipality‟s IDP and the budget.148  
 
The accounting officer of a municipality is responsible for the implementation of the 
municipality‟s approved budget.149 The MFMA provides that the municipal manager 
must, no later than 14 days after the approval of the annual budget; submit to the 
mayor a draft Service Delivery and Budget Implementation Plan (SDBIP) for the 
budget year together with the draft annual performance of the municipal manager 
and all senior managers.150 The SDBIP sets out monthly or quarterly service 
delivery and financial targets aligned with the annual targets set in the IDP and 
budget.151 The SDBIP thus outlines the available funding for the IDP projects. It 
must also determine the service delivery targets and performance indicators for 
each quarter.152 The SDBIP and IDP need to be fully aligned. The SDBIP lays the 
basis for the performance agreements of the municipal manager and senior 
managers.153 The IDP and SDBIP commit that the municipal manager and 
administration are responsible and accountable for meeting predetermined and set 
service delivery targets. 
 
The SDBIP thus provides the vital link between the executive, the municipal council 
and the administration and facilitates the process of holding management and 
executive accountable for performance. The SDBIP is a critical monitoring tool that 
facilitates concurrent oversight over the execution of the budget.  A properly 
formulated SDBIP will ensure that appropriate information is circulated internally 
and externally for the purposes of monitoring the execution of the budget, and the 
performance of senior managers. The National Treasury Circular provides that the 
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SDBIP is „essentially a management and implementation tool which sets in-year 
information, such as quarterly service delivery and monthly budget targets, and links 
each service delivery output to the budget of the municipality‟.154 The SDBIP can 
thus be used by the council as an implementation and management tool to monitor 
whether the IDP is adhered to. 
 
3.5.1 Adoption and content   
 
The mayor is obligated to ensure that the final SDBIP is approved within 28 days 
after the approval of the budget.155 The council delegates the authority of the 
drafting and implementation of the SDBIP to the municipal manager and senior 
managers.156 Because the SDBIP is a management and implementation plan (and 
not a policy proposal), it is not required to be approved by the municipal council. It 
is, however, tabled before the municipal council and published for information.157 
The municipal council‟s approval needs to be obtained only in the event that targets 
and performance indicators are to be changed, following the approval of an 
adjustment budget.158 
 
This means that the mayor or municipal manager may not on their own accord 
decide to revise service delivery targets in the event of poor performance.159 Thus, 
when performance targets are not met, the administration can be held accountable 
and corrective measures can be implemented.  
 
3.5.2 Relevance for oversight  
 
The SDBIP is critical in the implementation of oversight, as it is a tool by which the 
municipal council can monitor if the administration is implementing the development 
plan which was determined during the formulation of the IDP. It contains specific 
programme and project objectives, with deliverables, timeframes and budgets in 
which the administration must achieve specific measurable outcomes. The National 
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Treasury Guide to Municipal Finance and Management for Councillors describes 
the SDBIP as a tool that gives meaning to in-year reporting based on the monthly 
projections of revenue and expenditure that is aligned to the annual budget 
approved by council.160 The municipal council can use the SDBIP to conduct 
oversight over all aspects of the administration with the submission of the monthly, 
quarterly and mid-year reports.  
 
3.5.3 Budget Statements 
 
A municipality may incur expenditure only in terms of an approved budget. Any 
other expenditure amounts to unauthorised expenditure, which is defined as 
expenditure which was not incurred in terms of an approved budget.161 The budget 
is the central policy and governance instrument of a municipality, setting spending 
priorities and controlling expenditure.162 
 
The municipal manager must submit a monthly budget statement to the mayor and 
provincial treasury within ten working days at the end of each month.163 These 
statements include information about the actual revenue, actual borrowing and 
actual expenditure per vote, the amount of any allocation received and actual 
expenditure against those allocations.164 The budget statements explain whether 
any adjustments or deviations were made in terms of what was initially planned of 
expenditure projections by vote or the SDBIP.165 Thus the budget statement gives 
an indication if there was a change in terms of the planned expenditure which was 
to be incurred for projects. With the submission of the budget statements the 
council ought to be fully informed if there were any deviations or amendments in 
terms of what was initially planned in terms of the SDBIP. The timely submission of 
the monthly budget statements is crucial in ensuring that revenue is spent in 
accordance with the SDBIP, as well as to identify financial problems which the 
municipality may face. The council can use the monthly budget statements to 
determine whether the administration is on track in terms of the developmental 
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mandate, which is determined in the formulation of the IDP and the expenditure 
projections by vote or the SDBIP.  
 
Though the council does not receive the monthly budget statement, legislation does 
not prohibit it to request these statements in order to conduct oversight. It is 
submitted that neither the municipal manager or the mayor may refuse to provide 
the council with the budget statements as the council is legislatively mandated to 
conduct oversight and may use the budget statements to conduct oversight. Should 
the council request these monthly budget statements, they can be used for 
oversight. It furthermore gives the municipal council insight as to whether any 
adjustments were made within the planned projections and whether any corrective 
measures need to be implemented in the event where the administration either over 
spent or under spent against planned projections. The council can thus use the 
monthly projections as an oversight mechanism to hold the senior management 
accountable and it can also be used as a continuous monitoring tool with regard to 
the performance agreements of the senior management.  
 
3.6 Performance Agreements 
 
The Systems Act provides that the appointments of the municipal manager and 
managers directly accountable to the municipal manager are subject to an 
employment contract and a separate performance agreement.166 
 
The legislative framework indicates that performance agreements, as well as the 
employment contracts must contain cancellation clauses in the event of 
substandard performance or non-compliance with the employment contract or 
performance agreement.167 These performance agreements are essential as they 
are designed to promote accountability and to determine if the administration is 
implementing the key objectives set by the council in terms of the IDP and key 
performance indicators. Performance agreements form an integral part of the 
budgeting and IDP processes. Once the budget has been approved by the 
municipal council, the mayor can approve the SDBIP and annual performance 
agreements of the municipal manager and other senior managers.  
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Though the municipal council appoints the municipal manager, the performance 
agreement is concluded between the municipal manager and the mayor. Section 56 
managers enter into a performance agreement with the municipal manager.168 The 
council obtains copies of the performance agreements of Section 56 appointments. 
Section 75 of the MFMA provides that the accounting officer of a municipality must 
place on the municipal website all performance agreements required in terms of 
section 57(1)(b) of the Systems Act. Though the council does not get copies of the 
performance agreements, it may access them once they are placed on the 
website.169 Both the IDP and SDBIP could have the potential to assist the municipal 
council to determine if senior management have performed in terms of their 
performance agreements.  
 
The Municipal Performance Regulations for Managers provide that payment of 
performance bonuses must be subject to affordability after the end of the financial 
year.170 It furthermore provides that performance bonuses may only be awarded 
after an evaluation of the performance has been completed and the evaluation must 
have been approved by the council as reward for outstanding performance.171  In 
terms of the Regulations it is thus clear that performance bonuses are subject to the 
signing of performance agreements and the council should ensure that it conduct 
oversight over the performance of the senior managers and that the agreements 
are in place.  
 
3.7 Summary  
 
This chapter presented an overview of the structures and mechanisms to conduct 
oversight. Having identified the relevant legal provisions, structures and 
mechanisms to conduct oversight, the next chapter conducts a review on how these 
oversight structures and mechanisms were implemented by the Drakenstein 
municipality. 
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Chapter 4: Case Study of Drakenstein Municipality 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
Drakenstein Municipality will be reviewed as a case study for the period from 2006 
until 18 May 2011. This chapter provides an introduction to the role and functioning 
of the mayoral committee, the municipal council and oversight mechanisms within 
the municipal council. This chapter will review whether internal oversight was done 
within the municipality and how it can be improved.  
 
4.2. Composition of the Council from 2006 to 18 May 2011 
 
From 2006 to 18 May 2011 the Drakenstein Municipality was governed by the 
African National Congress172 in coalition with the Independent Democrats173 and 
various smaller political parties. In the council which consisted of 61 seats, the ANC 
coalition majority had 33 seats in the council compared to the 28 seats of the 
Democratic Alliance174 as the main opposition.  
 
4.2.1. Composition and Role of the Mayoral committee during the 
period 2006 to 18 May 2011       
 
 During the period under review Drakenstein Municipality had a mayoral 
committee to assist the executive mayor. The mayoral committee consisted of 7 
ANC members, 5 of the ID and 1 of the New National Party.175 While the ANC 
was in control of the council, smaller coalition partners often sided with the DA 
which led to an unstable political environment, particularly in July 2007 when 
the DA took over the council for a period of three months, with the support of 
the smaller political parties.  
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4.3 Committee system 
 
4.3.1 Introduction 
 
As mentioned in chapter two, various committees may be established to assist the 
executive mayor to implement and to assist the council to exercise oversight over 
the administration. The council may use these section 79 or section 80 committees 
to monitor whether the administration is delivering in terms of its developmental 
mandate and to make relevant recommendations, if needed. The role and functions 
of the various committees within the Drakenstein Municipality will be reviewed, as 
well as the functioning of the municipal council, and the reporting of the various 
committees to the council. 
 
4.3.2 Section 80 Committees in Drakenstein 
 
During the period under review the municipality had five directorates namely 
Finance, Corporate Services, Social Services and Infrastructure and Planning. At 
the council meeting dated 26 April 2006 the following section 80 portfolio 
committees and terms of reference were approved: 
  
 „Corporate and Strategic Services Committee; 
 
 Financial Services Committee; 
 
 Planning Committee; 
 
 Social, Economic and Rural Development Committee; 
 
 Housing and Infrastructure Committee, and  
 
 Sport, Recreation, Youth, Culture and Community Safety Committee.‟176 
 
The size and representation of the section 80 committees, which were approved in 
2006 comprised of the following parties: 
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Corporate and Strategic Services:  
 
4 ANC, 3 DA, 1 ID, 1 Federal 
Democrats,1 African Christian 
Democratic Party 
Financial Services:  4 ANC, 3 DA, 1 ID, 1 Western Cape 
Community Party(WCC), 1 Freedom 
Front 
Planning: 4 ANC, 3 DA, 3 ID 
Sport, Recreation, Youth, Culture and 
Community Safety:  
4 ANC, 3 DA, 2 ID, 1 WCC 
 
Housing and Infrastructure 4 ANC, 4 DA, 2 ID 
Social, Local Economic and Rural 
Development  
4 ANC, 4 DA, 1 ID 
 
 
Though the ANC coalition dominated the above mentioned section 80 committees, 
it was thus composed of councillors from various political parties in line with 
legislation.177 The executive mayor appointed the chairpersons and deputy 
chairpersons of the section 80 committees.178 
 
Though the law allows for the establishment of section 79 committees, Drakenstein 
Municipality established only section 80 committees on 26 April 2006. At that same 
municipal council meeting dated 26 April 2006, the opposition proposed an 
amendment to the recommendation of the executive mayor and tabled a motion that 
section 79 instead of section 80 committees be established.179 The Speaker, 
however, ruled that the amendment materially changed the proposal, and therefore 
could not be considered in terms of the Rules of Order.180 Importantly, the proposal 
of the establishment of section 79 committee was not debated. It is submitted that 
the ruling party did not realise the importance section 79 committees could play in 
conducting oversight. The establishment of section 80 committees only reflects that 
the ruling party wanted a greater measure of control over the committees, without 
necessarily considering oversight.  
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The terms of reference that was approved for the Corporate and Strategic Services 
Committee included auditing as one of its functions.181 At a council meeting held on 
the 30th of March 2006, before the establishment of section 80 committees, the 
opposition enquired whether the Audit Committee submitted any reports to the 
council. They were referred to the relevant section in the Annual Report dealing with 
the Audit Committee.182 It would appear as if the ruling party did not understand the 
role and function of an audit committee therefor the opposition was simply referred 
to the provision in the annual report dealing with the Audit Committee. At the time, 
Drakenstein Municipality did not have an Oversight Committee consisting of 
councillors, but had an Audit Committee and a Performance Audit Committee 
consisting of members of the public.183 Though the legal framework affords the 
municipality substantial discretion on how to structure its committee system, it 
would have been in the interest of good governance and democracy if a section 79 
committee consisting of councillors had been established.  
 
4.3.3  Public Accounts Committee 
 
In 2007, after the floor-crossing period, the ID and the DA formed a coalition party 
and were in control of the council.184 During this period a section 79 Standing 
Committee on Public Accounts was established.185  
 
At the council meeting held 30 August 2007, the ANC and the Federal Democrats 
indicated that they could not support the establishment of the Standing Committee 
on Public Accounts, as it would in their view be a duplication of the Audit Committee 
and portfolio committees.186 The matter was put to a vote and 30 votes were cast 
for the establishment of the section 79 Committee on Public Accounts, while 27 
councillors abstained from voting.187 It is important to bear in mind that the main 
function of the audit committee is to advise the council on the proper financial 
management of the municipality188 The oversight committee (standing committee on 
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public accounts) on the other hand is usually used for the purpose of considering 
the annual report and making recommendations to the council. The establishment 
of an oversight committee is not legislatively compulsory as in the case of the audit 
committee. The municipal council has a discretion whether to establish an oversight 
committee. The view of the opposition in this instance creates the impression that 
they did not view oversight as important and was not aware that it needs to be 
conducted by the council.  
 
The chairperson of the oversight committee alluded to above was a member of the 
coalition party. It would have been advisable, if the chairperson of the oversight 
committee had been a member of the opposition instead of the ruling party 
coalition. This signifies that there was a limited understanding of the importance of 
oversight, more specifically the independence of a section 79 Committee on Public 
Accounts. 
 
 When the ANC regained control of the council, all section 79 and section 80 
committees as well as ad-hoc committees of the council were disbanded as well as 
the Standing Committee on Public Accounts as it was viewed as a duplication of the 
audit committee.189 
 
4.3.4 Procedure for compilation and submission of the Oversight 
Report. 
  
Both the annual and oversight report is a requirement placed on municipalities and 
may assist the council in conducting and improving oversight. The annual report is a 
key reporting instrument for municipalities whereas the oversight report on the other 
hand contains detailed analysis and review of the annual report and is submitted at 
the end of the financial year. This section discusses two aspects of the procedure 
for the compilation and the submission of the oversight report, in order to highlight 
that the process can be manipulated to achieve a specific outcome. The manner in 
which Drakenstein Municipality managed the submission of the oversight report 
reflects that outcomes were manipulated.  
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4.3.4.1 Executive Interference 
 
In Drakenstein the chairperson of the Oversight Committee submits the draft 
Oversight Report to both the mayoral committee and the council.190 The 
chairperson first reports to the executive mayor, who approves or rejects it or 
refers the Oversight Report back for revision.191 Thus the draft report is first 
submitted to the mayoral committee and only then to the municipal council.192 
The mere fact that the draft oversight report is first referred to the mayoral 
committee and not the council is indicative that the outcome may be manipulated. 
The oversight report should be submitted to the council whose duty it is to 
conduct oversight.  
 
4.3.4.2 Administrative Interference 
 
Contrary to the intention behind the regulatory framework, the administration 
facilitates the process of compiling the Oversight Report in Drakenstein 
municipality.193 The minutes of the Annual Report Oversight Committee indicate 
that: “Strategic Planning Unit will send out the second draft to the executive 
management team, if they are satisfied, it will be sent to the Annual Report 
Oversight Committee for scrutiny or to make comments and add additional 
information.”194 
 
The mere fact that the second draft is sent to the executive management team is 
an indication that the Oversight Report is not an objective report. Executive 
sanction is given to the report before it is sent to the Oversight Committee. It is 
submitted that the top management team of Drakenstein municipality should not 
be involved in the process, as their involvement affords them the opportunity to 
influence reporting.  
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The above practice is not necessarily illegal though. The Structures Act makes 
provision that the executive mayor is entitled to receive reports from committees of 
the municipal council and to forward these reports with recommendations to the 
Council.195 The Regulation of Drakenstein: Roles and Responsibilities of the 
Council, Political Structures, Office bearers and municipal manager provide that 
where the Council has appointed section 79 committees, such committees should 
submit their reports and recommendations via the mayoral committee.196 The 
same Regulations make provision that, should the mayor wish to submit an 
amended or different recommendation to the municipal council, he or she may do 
so.197 According to the Regulations, this process allows consultation with the 
mayor, while at the same time allowing the Oversight Committee the opportunity to 
fulfil their mandate of reporting to the council.198 However the fact that the 
committee needs to submit its recommendations via the mayoral committee 
indicates that the mayoral committee may amend oversight reports before they are 
submitted to the council.  
 
This practice does not enhance oversight as genuine oversight would entail that 
oversight reports are submitted directly to the municipal council. 
 
4.3.4.3 Content of the Oversight Committee Report in respect of the 
Drakenstein Municipality Annual Report 2008/2009 and 
2009/2010 
 
In this section the shortcomings of the content of the oversight reports will be    
highlighted. The Drakenstein‟s Oversight Committee Report in respect of the 
Annual Report 2008/2009 and 2009/2010 reflects on the challenges facing the 
municipality and makes recommendations on how to overcome them.199 The 
report of the Oversight Committee consisted of two oversight reports over the two 
years. An analysis of the Oversight Report reveals that it did not provide a detailed 
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analysis of the annual report as required.200 It did not explicitly refer to any of the 
issues, which the Annual Report Oversight Committee indicated as outstanding in 
the Annual Report.201 For example the 2008/2009 Annual Report, which was 
released for public comment, did not include audited financial statements and it did 
not include the Auditor General‟s report as required by section 121(3) of the 
MFMA. Neither did it include particulars of any corrective action needed, or 
recommendations of the municipality‟s Audit Committee as required by section 
121(3)(j) of the MFMA. The Oversight Committee of the municipal council could 
thus not have been in a position to provide a comprehensive Oversight Report, 
because of the non-availability of accountability reports. Though this had a 
negative effect on the municipal council exercising oversight, the mere fact that 
there is no record which indicates that the matter was dealt with creates the 
impression that it might not have been addressed. It would appear that the council 
conveniently overlooked a very important aspect of oversight by not reviewing 
substantive documentation.  
 
Though the Auditor-General‟s report of 2009/2010 was attached as an annexure to  
the Oversight Report which was ultimately submitted to the municipal council, the 
Oversight Report did not make any reference to the audit or accountability 
concerns that were raised by the Auditor-General.202 
  
Whenever the opposition party was not in agreement with the Oversight Report, it 
could only voice its discontent. An example of this is the fact that the opposition 
abstained from voting on the adoption of the Oversight Committee Report in 
respect of the Annual Report for the 2009/2010 Financial Year.203  
 
The 2009/2010 Oversight Report lacks pertinent information. For example, the 
minutes of the Oversight Committee indicate that “directorates do not capture 
information correctly in the IDP”, but no reference is made to it in the Oversight 
Report, nor is there any mention of this issue in the recommendations.204 
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Furthermore, the Oversight Report of 2009/2010 does not make any reference to 
the mayoral “ward projects”, yet this was discussed in the minutes of the meeting 
held with the Annual Report Oversight Committee.205 The Oversight Report is thus 
not used for the intended purpose, namely to improve oversight of the municipal 
council over the administration. This is as a result of the lack of information in the 
report itself.   
 
4.4 Functioning of the Council 
 
4.4.1 Reporting by the Executive Mayor to the Municipal Council 
 
The municipal council is enabled to conduct oversight with the provision of regular 
reports. These reports, however, need to be interrogated. This requires that the  
administration provides detailed and comprehensive reports to the council, which 
must have a full understanding of the content of the reports. Councillors must 
assess the content and the implications of reports submitted to it.  
 
The administration of Drakenstein regularly forwards reports to all councillors to be 
informed of the state of affairs within the municipality. However, this does not 
necessarily mean that all councillors understand the content of the reports. Non-
executive councillors are often junior members within the municipal council and do 
not have sufficient influence or experience within the system to challenge 
administrative shortcomings.  
 
In practice it appears as if the municipal council in Drakenstein has limited capacity 
to conduct oversight and conducting oversight is viewed as the role of opposition 
parties. This assertion is based on the fact that council minutes do not reflect that 
the council questions the various aspects of non-compliance, for example those 
referred to in the oversight report. In most instances, the municipal council merely 
goes through the motions of oversight by receiving reports and posing questions in 
relation to matters of clarification. There also appears to be no platform for 
constructive engagement and interrogation.  
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As a general practice, section 56 managers attend municipal council meetings. 
There are no internal records of the council requesting briefings on financial reports 
in relation to for example the feasibility and sustainability of development projects. 
Normally presentations are made to the mayoral committee by consultants 
regarding development projects and afterwards the administration makes a formal 
submission to the mayoral committee, who then approves it and notifies the 
municipal council. An example of a development project whereby the role of the 
council was marginalised is the Paarl Waterfront development, which served at the  
mayoral committee since 30 July 2008. Presentations by consultants were only 
made to the mayoral committee.206 The council was notified of the decision to 
approve the development project and was provided with background information 
contained in the agenda. The municipal council was thus not privy to these 
presentations and had insufficient information to make informed decisions. Even 
though legislation provides that the mayoral committee only needs to forward 
matters, which it cannot dispose of to the council,207 it is recommended that 
presentations regarding development projects should be made concurrently to  
council and to the mayoral committee. Being privy to presentations outlining  
development projects will ensure that the council has sufficient information to 
conduct meaningful oversight. 
 
4.4.2 Internal Audit Unit 
 
As indicated in chapter three, the role of an internal audit unit is that it should assist 
the municipal council to implement effective oversight mechanisms through the 
implementation of internal control systems. Despite the fact that Drakenstein 
Municipality has an internal audit unit, it is suggested that it was not optimally 
utilised during the period 2006 to 18 May 2011. 
 
Drakenstein‟s internal audit unit may only investigate upon instruction from the 
municipal manager.208An example of this is the motion by the opposition requesting 
that an investigation be conducted by the internal audit unit pertaining to the 
purchasing of flags and international trips in relation to the 2010 World Cup project 
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as related to Drakenstein Municipality.209 In this instance the ruling party held that 
the questions raised in the motions were adequately answered by the 
administration.210 The opposition requested that their objection to the above and to 
the fact that the motion was not put to the vote, be recorded.211 In this instance the 
Internal Audit Unit could only have investigated matters when instructed to so by the 
municipal council. It is the contention of this paper that the challenge is that the 
internal audit unit‟s involvement in investigations is determined by the ruling party.  
 
4.4.3  Audit Committee 
 
The Audit Committee in Drakenstein Municipality plays a critical role in promoting 
accountability by providing the municipal council with information on the financial 
management of the municipality. Drakenstein Municipality established an Audit 
Committee in 2007.212  
 
The council minutes reflect that performance appraisal was one of the duties of the 
Audit Committee.213 The Audit Committee consisted of two accountants, one 
chartered accountant, an attorney and a community worker.214 None of these Audit 
Committee members had experience or were qualified in performance auditing 
which led to the committee being disbanded. The minutes reflect that the members 
of the disbanded Audit Committee were to be replaced with committee members 
with expertise in performance management. However this did not materialise.215 
This seriously affected the council‟s ability to conduct oversight. 
 
The municipal council approved another Audit Committee charter in October 
2009.216 The Performance Audit Committee was not active during the 2009/2010 
financial year as the chairperson of the Performance Audit Committee was only 
appointed in March 2010 and the Performance Audit Committee held its first 
meeting on 19 April 2010. Bearing in mind that the Audit Committee needs to report 
directly to the municipal council, it is prudent to note that in Drakenstein Municipality 
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provision was made that the executive mayor or her nominee attends the Audit 
Committee meetings on invitation of the Audit Committee in order to ensure direct 
communication on issues raised.217 The presence of the mayor should enhance 
matters relating to oversight; however, in practice it could also be a way of 
influencing oversight reporting of the Audit Committee or intimidating the Audit 
Committee.  
 
4.5 Performance Management  
 
4.5.1 Practice of the Council engagement with performance agreement 
 
This section highlights shortcomings in how the performance management system 
in Drakenstein Municipality was implemented during the 2009/2012 financial year. 
The tabling of the performance agreements at the council needs to be done 
simultaneously or prior to  the public publication of the performance agreements in 
terms of section 53(3)(b) of the MFMA so as to enable the council to conduct 
oversight. However, this does not always happen. For example, there is no record 
of municipal council minutes, indicating that performance agreements of the 
municipal manager and the executive directors had been submitted to the mayoral 
committee and the municipal council for the 2009/2010 financial year for notification 
purposes.  
 
It is important to note that in reviewing the municipality‟s performance management 
system, the performance audit committee must focus on economy, efficiency, 
effectiveness and impact in so far as the key performance indicators and 
performance targets set by the municipality are concerned.218 The mere fact that no 
record exist that performance agreements were submitted to the mayoral committee 
and the council is tantamount to non-compliance with governance and transparency 
principles. This in turn had an impact on oversight, as the municipal council was not 
informed of what was contained in the performance agreements in terms of section 
57(1) and (2) of the Systems Act.  
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It appears as if the council was deliberately impeded in its oversight function, 
because no record exists, which indicates that this matter was addressed by the 
municipal council or the mayoral committee. There is also no record that 
performance management agreements of executive directors were signed before 
the regulatory deadline in terms of section 57 of the Systems Act. This implies that 
there were no agreed upon indicators against which the council could measure 
whether the municipal manager and executive directors were indeed performing. 
This in itself hampers the municipal council to exercise effective oversight. Though 
Drakenstein Municipality has a municipal website since 2006, the performance 
agreements were not posted on the municipal website.219  It is important to note that 
the municipal council appoints the executive directors in terms of section 57 of the 
Systems Act and as such ought to be informed of the performance agreements. 
However, there is no evidence which indicates that the performance agreements of 
the municipal manager and the executive directors for the 2009/2010 financial year 
had been tabled at the mayoral committee and the council for notification 
purposes.220  
 
The failure to submit performance agreements reflects that the administration could 
fabricate that they were implementing the developmental mandate as determined in 
the IDP process, even when there were no performance agreements against which 
this could be measured. In the audit conducted by the Auditor-General this incident 
of non-compliance was detected.221 The non-compliance with section 45 as 
highlighted in the Auditor- General report clearly indicates that the performance 
contracts were not compiled and approved at the beginning of the financial year.222 
The municipal council minutes do not indicate whether the municipal council 
commented on the matter and if so, how it was addressed. The municipal council 
was thus not in a position to exercise effective oversight as to whether the municipal 
manager and executive directors were performing. 
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4.5.2  Drakenstein’s implementation of PMS  
 
Section 45 of the Systems Act provides that performance must be audited. Failure 
to implement section 45 of the Systems may have adverse consequences for 
Drakenstein Municipality, including the application of unrealistic targets for 
performance management systems, thus compromising performance reward 
systems. As explained in chapter three, the performance management system can 
be used by the municipal council to conduct oversight to determine if the 
performance targets set by the municipality are economic, efficient and effective 
and if it has the desired impact in terms of services rendered to the community. 
 
As discussed above, the municipality failed to comply with section 57(1)(b) of the 
Systems Act because the council did not conclude performance agreements with 
the municipal manager and section 56 appointees for the 2005/06 and 2006/07 
financial years within the prescribed time frame. The performance agreements were 
not published on the website as determined by the Systems Act, reflecting that 
there was deviation from the regulatory framework. 
 
In its report the Auditor General provided that the municipality failed to develop and 
implement mechanisms, systems and processes for auditing the results of 
performance measurement as part of its internal audit processes required in terms 
of section 45 of the Systems Act.223 The report furthermore highlights that the 
Performance Audit Committee did not review the quarterly reports of the internal 
auditors.224 The Auditor -General reported that planned and reported performance 
targets were not specific, in that they failed to identify the nature and required level 
of performance. Also, that the required performance was not measurable and not 
time bound, as it did not specify the deadline for delivery.225 
 
The internal auditors failed to submit quarterly reports to the Auditor-General to 
prove that performance information was audited.226 There was thus no record of 
legislative compliance and reliability in measurement of indicators. This implies that 
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there was no submission of quarterly reports by senior management to the 
municipal manager and Audit Committee.  
 
For two consecutive years the Auditor-General reported that the performance 
management system at Drakenstein Municipality was not in place.227 This had 
detrimental consequences for the manner in which the Drakenstein municipal 
council implemented oversight. The municipal council was put in a position where it 
could not detect under-performance and implement corrective action. Most 
importantly with the performance management system not in place, the municipal 
council could not effectively conduct oversight. There was a lack of political will to 
interrogate the fact that performance management systems were not in place. 
Importantly, the municipal council did not address the non-compliance issues that 
were raised by the Auditor-General. Thus the municipal council failed to exercise 
oversight. Based on the municipality‟s non-compliance with section 45 of the 
Systems Act one can conclude that the municipality created a false impression that 
senior officials had met the required standards, as set out in the performance 
agreements. 
  
4.5.3 Political Culture: Mayoral Committee in Practice  
 
Paradza et al. argues that the interaction of political parties in a municipality 
influences the way in which councillors can perform their roles.228Politics set the 
tone and influence relations between the various interest groups.229 By the same 
token political systems allow for multi-party agreements to ensure majority 
governance and provide some political stability. However, practice in the 
Drakenstein Municipality shows that it becomes detrimental to the developmental 
objectives of local government. In the Drakenstein Municipality, like in many other 
municipalities, party political factionalism and the subsequent creation of new 
political alliances and elites contributed to a progressive deterioration.230Thus, 
whenever the mayoral committee of Drakenstein decided on a particular course of 
action, the decision was carried even if the decision was rejected by the opposition 
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in the council. Even though party members may have wished to question decisions, 
they were not in a position to do so because non-executive councillors did not form 
part of the mayoral committee and were effectively silenced. Besides party political 
caucus meetings, there was no platform within the council where non-executive 
councillors could interrogate issues or questioned decisions. The decisions that 
were made by the mayoral committee were endorsed and the opposition parties 
could only voice their discontent. with regard to decisions taken.  
 
The legislative framework makes provision that only issues which cannot be 
disposed of by the mayoral committee in terms of its delegated authority are 
referred to the municipal council.231 The municipal council thus decides how much 
the mayoral committee may dispose of. It would appear that within the Drakenstein 
executive mayoral committee system and because of the political majority, the 
council only „rubberstamps‟ mayoral committee decisions. An example of this would 
be the adoption of the revised Performance Management Policy in June 2008, 
where the smaller parties were not in favour of the revised policy and as such 
objected to the amended policy.232 In as much as the adoption of this reflects the 
practice of democracy, it was against the wishes of smaller parties. Instead of this 
issue being debated what happened was that the matter was immediately put to a 
vote without the objections of the smaller parties being considered and the proposal 
of the executive mayor and mayoral committee was accepted.233Failure of the 
council to take cognisance of the objections to performance management practices 
had detrimental consequences for oversight because it reflected that objections had 
little impact on ruling party will.  
 
4.5.4 Summary 
 
This chapter examined the law and practice surrounding oversight by the council 
over the municipal executive and the municipal administration. This was done by 
examining how Drakenstein municipality deviated from the legislative prescripts for 
local government. It provided an analysis of the functioning of the municipal council 
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and the implementation of oversight by the council. An analysis was provided on the 
emergence of oversight committees.  
 
This chapter cites examples of the disregard of the principles of oversight with the 
establishment of Section 79 and Section 80 committees, the compilation of the 
Oversight report, the establishment of the Audit committee and the development of 
a performance management system. While this may be reflective of a disregard to 
the principles of oversight, it also reflects that the legislative prescripts are open to 
manipulation and interpretation. The fact that municipal governance systems and 
processes can be manipulated through political expediency is not conducive to 
good governance.   
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Chapter 5:  Summary and Recommendations 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter aims to present the summary of the findings and the conclusions that 
can be derived from the analysis. 
 
5.2 Summary of findings 
 
In Chapter 2 the paper dealt with the legislative framework of local government as it 
relates to the systems and structures of municipalities. It reflected on the lack of 
separation of powers in terms of the Constitution and the choice of executive 
structures available to municipalities. This chapter highlighted that a lack of 
separation of powers within the council is a challenge to good governance and 
service delivery, because if the municipality fails to design appropriate internal 
oversight systems it may lead to the abuse of power, mal administration, fraud and 
corruption. 
  
Chapter 3 examined the structures and mechanisms for oversight which may be 
used within the municipality such as the IDP, SDBIP and performance agreements. 
It reflects on the role and functions of political structures such as section 79 and 
section 80 committees as it relates to oversight, as well as the internal structures 
such as the internal audit unit and the oversight report.  
 
It concluded that the municipal council needs to ensure that adequate use is made 
of the internal audit unit and the audit committee.  
 
This chapter concluded that, by utilising the annual report and monthly budget 
statements and other mechanisms, the municipal council can improve oversight, to 
determine whether the municipality was afforded value in terms of the budget that 
was spent and the viability and sustainability of projects.   
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5.3 Case Study of the Drakenstein Municipality. 
 
Chapter 4 focused on oversight in the Drakenstein municipality. It located the 
institution within the timeframe from 2006 to May 2011 and critically analysed the 
broader oversight mechanisms and practice of the Drakenstein Municipality. It used 
the executive mayoral system as a point of reference and in this regard it focuses 
on the choice of section 79 and section 80 committees. It also analysed the various 
oversight mechanisms in place at this institution including the internal audit unit, the 
audit committee and uses documents and records from the institution to critically 
analyse the operation in terms of content and compliance with the MFMA and 
Systems Act. It was held that members from the ruling party dominated these 
committees because the ruling party determined the number of councillors from 
each respective party who would serve on these committees. This case study 
illustrated that though there were various committees which the municipal council 
might have established to assist it in conducting oversight, these were only 
established to ensure legislative compliance. The municipal councils failed to make 
adequate use of the mechanisms and structures afforded to it in terms of the 
legislative framework to ensure that oversight was effectively conducted.  
 
The Drakenstein‟s Oversight Committee Report was a clear example of the failure 
to do oversight in the municipality in that it did not provide a detailed analysis of the 
Annual Report nor did it include audited financial statements or the Auditor 
General‟s report. It furthermore did not include particulars of any corrective action 
needed, or recommendations of the municipality‟s Audit Committee. Due to the non-
availability of accountability reports the Oversight Committee of the municipal 
council was not in a position to provide a comprehensive Oversight Report. This 
had a negative effect on the municipal council exercising oversight. The Oversight 
Report did not make any reference to performance highlights, even though it is a 
legislative requirement that performance must be audited. The council was not 
placed in a position to determine if performance targets set were achieved. The 
Oversight Report lacked critical information which was needed in order for the 
council to conduct effective oversight. 
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It can be concluded from this case study of Drakenstein municipality that both 
political and administrative systems require vast improvement as it relates to the 
establishment of systems and practices on how to conduct oversight.  
 
5.4 Recommendations 
 
The scope of this research paper is too limited to effectively deal with all the  
aspects of maintaining and sustaining effective and efficient oversight and 
accountability systems, but it may add value to the body of knowledge surrounding 
oversight and accountability within local government. More specifically the research 
paper aims to support and improve oversight in the Drakenstein Municipality. Thus 
the following recommendations are made: 
 
5.4.1 Review of the Executive mayoral System 
 
The executive mayoral committee system must be reviewed by National 
Government. As indicated in chapter four, this system allows for a monopolisation 
of administrative processes as the mayoral committee exercises direct control over 
the administration with the drafting and sanctioning of policies, by-laws and 
determining the developmental objectives of the municipality. Instead, what is 
required is a system in which the municipal council actively participates in the 
drafting and approving of policies. Several recommendations regarding the review 
of the executive mayoral system is made by the South African Local Government 
Association.234 SALGA recommends that in a fully separated municipality, the 
section 80 committees and the Mayoral Committee is overseen by the section 79 
committees who will then be tasked with the political oversight function.235 It is 
furthermore recommended that the section 79 oversight committee be able to 
interrogate the actions and decisions of the mayoral committee, demand 
explanations and make recommendations to the council on matters considered by 
it. 236These recommendations will enhance oversight, curb the abuse of power and 
enhance democracy.  
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5.4.2  Oversight Committees  
 
Municipalities should be compelled by legislation to ensure the establishment of 
multi-party oversight committees.  
 
The critical difference between section 79 and section 80 committees are that 
section 79 committees comprise of councillors from various political parties whereas 
section 80 committees only comprise of councillors from the ruling party. It is 
recommended that portfolio committees comprise of Section 79 committees instead 
of Section 80 committees. A member of the ruling party may still chair the 
committee or alternatively the position of chairperson should rotate. This would 
advance democracy and curb the abuse of power.  
 
It is recommended that various oversight committees with relevant expertise  
comprising of non-executive  councillors in terms of section 79 are elected. The aim 
of these oversight committees should be to monitor and evaluate the respective 
directorates to ensure that projects listed in the IDP are successfully implemented. 
This analysis will then be submitted to the respective portfolio holder and the 
municipal council. These oversight committees assist the council with conducting 
continuous oversight. The municipality must develop a framework and indicators on 
how oversight will be conducted which is submitted to the council for approval. 
These oversight committees should submit reports with the monthly budget 
statement. Such information will provide the council with a comprehensive picture of 
administrative performance. 
 
5.4.2.1  Internal Audit 
 
It is recommended that the internal audit unit be tasked with the analysis of the 
annual report and monthly budget statements and that the analysis of these reports 
be submitted via the audit committee to the municipal council. Oversight will be 
greatly enhanced if the audit committee submits regular monthly reports to the 
municipal council regarding all aspects of financial and legislative compliance. 
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5.4.2.2  Annual Report and oversight report 
 
Bearing in mind that the oversight report is based on the Annual Report, it is 
important that all components of the Annual Report should be made available and 
discussed at the oversight committee before it is submitted to the council. 
 
A committee consisting of councillors should draft the oversight report, without any 
assistance from the administration. The only role the administration must play in the 
process is to provide relevant information. 
 
6. Capacity for oversight  
 
It is recommended that municipal councils conduct an analysis of councillors from 
the various political parties who possess the relevant skills and expertise to analyse 
and interrogate reports. These councillors may then be elected to serve on 
oversight committees. Political parties should ensure that candidates receive proper 
training prior to being nominated. Political parties should ensure that they educate 
potential councillors before nomination and hold councillors accountable to a code 
of ethics; which is rigorously enforced at a party political level. A minimum standard 
of qualification should be required to in order to be nominated. Once elected, they 
would have to undergo continuous training to equip them to conduct oversight. 
 
6.1 Research assistance for councillors 
 
It is recommended that municipal councils address the lack of capacity to conduct 
oversight, by ensuring that there is a directorate within the administration to assist 
councillors with research and conducting oversight. If competent and qualified 
researchers are appointed, the council could be kept abreast with information and 
policy changes that have an impact on governance. These researchers will provide 
valuable information and can assist councillors on request and may also research 
matters on request by the various portfolio and oversight committees. If councillors 
are provided with research material pertaining to the various structures and 
mechanisms which can be implemented to conduct oversight, they will be well 
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informed and can formulate informed opinions when submissions are made by the 
administration. Furthermore, the skills of councillors can be significantly developed 
and improved with the provision of research material. This research directorate 
should be located within the Speaker‟s office and should be charged with the 
mandate to assist oversight and portfolio committees. The directorate should 
administratively report the municipal manager but be independent. Councillors 
should liaise directly with the researchers who will be the link to the administration. 
The researchers should assist the councillors with the following:  
 
 analysis of  the annual report; 
 
 analysing of financial statements including monthly budget reports which    
are submitted to the council; and 
 
 analysing of the IDP and SDBIP and how it interlinks with the performance 
agreements; 
 
From the discussion above, it is clear that even though the legislative framework 
does not explicitly state how oversight should be implemented, the legal framework 
makes adequate provision for it to be implemented in all aspects of municipal 
governance. Oversight is critical for good governance and can only be improved 
within an environment where quality, ethical leadership is provided and where 
administrative appointments are made based on academic qualifications and skill 
rather than political affiliation. In this regard the council needs to exercise its 
oversight function in order to ensure that the senior management within the 
municipality is committed to carrying out its responsibilities.  
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